【軍傳媒／國際軍事新聞】中東局勢因美國對伊朗軍事行動與伊朗的反擊而迅速升高。伊朗不僅動用彈道飛彈與巡弋飛彈，同時大量使用長程單向攻擊無人機（one-way attack UAV），使衝突呈現出典型的「高密度低成本攻擊」特徵。對美軍而言，這場衝突不僅是一場短期打擊行動，更逐漸演變為可能拉長的消耗戰。
伊朗初期的反擊目標是美軍的衛星通訊戰以及雷達站，目的在削弱美軍偵測來襲目標以及通訊能力，試圖降低美軍的戰場感知以及防空整合，從戰術層面觀察，伊朗初期反擊的目標並非單純追求摧毀大型軍事設施，而是更著重於削弱聯軍的偵測與防空能力。從商業衛星的照片來看，美軍的確有數個衛星通訊站以及雷達受損。現代防空體系的效能很大程度取決於早期預警、目標追蹤與資料鏈整合能力，一旦預警雷達或相關設施遭到破壞，即使防空武器仍然存在，其攔截效率也會下降。
另一方面，伊朗大量使用無人機與飛彈對海灣國家及美軍基地周邊發動攻擊。根據公開報導，阿拉伯聯合大公國在短時間內便偵測到超過一千架無人機與近兩百枚彈道飛彈的威脅，顯示這類攻擊已具有規模化與多方向的特性。這種攻擊方式的目的並不完全是造成重大破壞，而是迫使防空系統長時間保持高度警戒，消耗攔截彈與作戰資源。
長程自殺無人機之所以成為各國軍事衝突中的重要武器，主要在於其成本與效益比極具優勢。以伊朗常見的Shahed系列無人機為例，其製造成本遠低於巡弋飛彈，但卻具備數百至上千公里的航程。部分研究指出，中型單向攻擊無人機的航程甚至可達兩千公里以上，使其在實際戰場效果上逐漸接近廉價版巡弋飛彈。
這類武器帶來的另一個問題，是傳統防空系統並非專為這種目標設計。多數防空雷達與攔截流程原本優先處理高速、高空飛行的飛彈或戰機，而長程自殺無人機往往採取低空、慢速、小型目標的飛行模式，使其在雷達畫面上較難辨識。此外，無人機可以以大批數量分波次進行飽和攻擊，進一步壓縮防空系統的反應時間。
這種攻擊方式最大的戰略價值，在於能夠迫使對手進入成本極高的防禦循環。美軍與盟友目前主要依賴愛國者飛彈與THAAD等系統攔截飛彈威脅，但若使用昂貴的攔截飛彈來對付大量廉價無人機，長期而言將形成不利的成本交換。換言之，即使防空系統成功攔截多數來襲武器，攻擊方仍可能在經濟與生產能力上取得優勢，甚至在消耗之後利用補充的空檔再以高速彈道飛彈或巡弋飛彈攻擊獲取戰果。
伊朗的想定美軍當然知道，美軍目前採取的作法，並非單純依賴攔截，而是建立多層次防禦結構。第一層是區域整合防空反飛彈體系，由愛國者飛彈、THAAD以及具備彈道飛彈防禦能力的神盾驅逐艦標準飛彈負責處理高威脅目標。第二層則是專門針對無人機威脅的反無人機系統，包括電子干擾、航空兵力攔截以及其他較低成本防空手段。第三層則是將攻擊行動前推至敵方武器來源，例如摧毀無人機發射位置、儲存設施與生產工廠。
即便有上述措施，基本上面對大量的低成本消耗型無人機攻擊，攻擊方仍佔有相對的優勢，因此美軍也開始導入低成本攻擊無人機，以回應「廉價武器大量化」的趨勢。例如這次投入中東戰區的LUCAS（Low-cost Unmanned Combat Attack System）系統，單價約三萬多美元，強調可快速生產並大量部署。這顯示美軍正試圖以相同的成本結構回應敵方的消耗戰策略。
從戰略角度觀察，伊朗的反擊行動具有明確目的，即透過大量低成本武器拖延戰事時間，使美軍必須同時投入大量資源於防禦與打擊任務。美國官員也公開表示，未來行動將著重於削弱伊朗飛彈與無人機生產能力，這意味著衝突可能不會在短時間內結束，而是逐漸轉為一場工業與補給能力的較量。
對台灣而言，中東戰場的經驗具有高度參考價值。首先，台灣必須建立專門針對低空慢速目標的防空能力。傳統防空飛彈雖然能攔截無人機，但成本過高，因此需要發展短程防空飛彈、機砲防空系統以及反無人機干擾設備，以形成更具經濟效益的防禦方式。換言之，防空體系應朝向大量化與低成本方向發展，無人機戰爭的核心不再只是單一高性能武器，而是能否持續生產與補充作戰資源。建立國產化的無人機與反無人機系統，將有助於提升長期作戰能力。
其次，關鍵軍事設施與通訊系統的防護與備援能力必須提升。現代戰爭中，雷達、通信與指揮系統往往成為優先攻擊目標，一旦這些設施受損，整體防空效能將受到影響。因此分散部署、機動式雷達與快速修復能力都應納入防衛規劃。
第三，台灣需要建立能夠追蹤並打擊敵方無人機發射來源的能力。如果僅依靠終端攔截，面對大規模飽和攻擊將難以長期維持。透過偵察無人機、遠程火力與電子戰系統，提前壓制敵方發射能力，才能降低整體威脅。
最後，關鍵民生基礎設施的保護同樣重要。長程自殺無人機不僅可攻擊軍事目標，也能對港口、能源設施與通信系統造成影響，這次伊朗攻擊卡達的天然氣設施以及阿聯的石油煉製設施就是一例，尤其台灣又缺乏能源自生產能力，因此防空規劃不應只限於軍事基地，而應納入全島重要設施的防護。
整體而言，中東戰場顯示出一個明確趨勢：未來戰爭將愈來愈依賴大量廉價、可消耗的無人系統。對防禦方而言，真正的挑戰不只是攔截敵方武器，而是如何在長時間消耗戰中維持感測能力、指揮系統與防空火力的持續運作。這場衝突所揭示的戰術與戰略變化，對於台灣未來的防衛規劃具有重要的參考價值。
The Era of Drone Attrition Warfare: Strategic Lessons from Iran’s Retaliation and the Pressure on U.S. Air Defense
Tensions in the Middle East have escalated following U.S. military operations against Iran and Tehran’s subsequent retaliation. Iran has employed not only ballistic and cruise missiles but also large numbers of long-range one-way attack UAVs, creating a pattern of high-density, low-cost strikes. For the United States, the confrontation is gradually shifting from a short-term military operation to a potential war of attrition.
Iran’s early strikes reportedly targeted satellite communication facilities and radar installations used by U.S. forces. The aim was to reduce detection capability and disrupt communications, thereby weakening battlefield awareness and the integration of air defense systems. Commercial satellite imagery suggests that several communication facilities and radar systems were damaged. Because modern air defense relies heavily on early warning, target tracking, and data integration, damage to these systems can significantly reduce interception efficiency.
Iran has also launched large numbers of drones and missiles toward Gulf states and areas surrounding U.S. bases. Reports indicate that the United Arab Emirates detected over a thousand drones and nearly two hundred ballistic missiles within a short period. Such attacks are not always intended to cause major destruction but to keep air defense forces under constant pressure, exhausting interceptors and operational resources.
Long-range suicide drones have become influential weapons largely due to their favorable cost-effectiveness. Iran’s Shahed-series drones, for example, cost far less than cruise missiles yet can fly hundreds or even thousands of kilometers. Some studies suggest their range can exceed two thousand kilometers, giving them operational effects similar to low-cost cruise missiles.
These weapons also challenge traditional air defense systems. Most defenses were designed to counter fast, high-altitude threats, while suicide drones often fly low, slow, and with small radar signatures. In addition, drones can be launched in large numbers in saturation attacks, reducing reaction time for defenders.
This creates a costly defensive cycle. U.S. and allied forces rely heavily on systems such as Patriot and THAAD to intercept missile threats. However, using expensive interceptors against large numbers of cheap drones produces an unfavorable cost exchange. Even if most incoming weapons are intercepted, the attacker may still gain an economic advantage and exploit gaps with follow-up missile strikes.
The U.S. military has responded by building a layered defense system. The first layer consists of integrated missile defense using Patriot, THAAD, and Aegis destroyers with Standard missiles. The second layer includes specialized counter-drone systems such as electronic warfare, aircraft interception, and lower-cost air defense measures. The third layer targets the source of the attacks by striking drone launch sites, storage areas, and production facilities.
Despite these measures, attackers using large numbers of low-cost drones still hold a relative advantage. As a result, the United States has begun deploying its own inexpensive attack drones. One example is the LUCAS system, which costs roughly thirty thousand dollars per unit and is designed for rapid production and mass deployment. This reflects a shift toward matching the cost structure of attrition warfare.
Iran’s strategy appears aimed at prolonging the conflict by forcing the United States to devote significant resources to both defense and offensive operations. U.S. officials have indicated that future efforts will focus on weakening Iran’s missile and drone production capacity, suggesting the conflict could become a longer contest of industrial and logistical endurance.
For Taiwan, the lessons are clear. First, Taiwan should develop air defense specifically designed for low-altitude, slow-moving threats, including short-range missiles, anti-aircraft guns, and electronic counter-drone systems. Defense structures must emphasize scale and affordability rather than relying solely on expensive systems.
Second, the protection and redundancy of key military and communication facilities must be strengthened. Radar, communications, and command systems are likely priority targets, making dispersed deployment and rapid repair capabilities essential.
Third, Taiwan should develop the ability to detect and strike enemy drone launch sources. Relying only on terminal interception would be difficult to sustain against large-scale saturation attacks.
Finally, the protection of civilian infrastructure is critical. Long-range suicide drones can target ports, energy facilities, and communications networks. Because Taiwan relies heavily on imported energy, protecting such infrastructure should be a key part of national air defense planning.
Overall, the Middle Eastern battlefield highlights a growing trend: future conflicts will increasingly involve large numbers of inexpensive unmanned systems. The challenge for defenders is not only interception but sustaining detection, command, and air defense capabilities throughout a prolonged attrition campaign.