【軍傳媒／軍事專欄】在現代戰爭中，「空優」往往被視為陸海作戰能否成功的起點。然而，面對解放軍具備大規模遠程打擊與制空能力的條件，臺灣在戰事發生初期極有可能進入一段「無空優、甚至無制空」的戰略環境。在此情況下，陸軍能否持續有效輸出火力、保存戰力並削弱敵軍，是攸關島嶼防衛成敗的關鍵。戰場主角不再是大規模集中砲兵，而是 分散、隱蔽、可穿插、不對稱的火力節點。輪式自走砲因其高度機動性、快速射擊節奏與地形適應力，正是未來臺灣地面作戰中最具「生存力與戰鬥持續力」的火力平台之一。
In modern warfare, “air superiority” is often viewed as the foundation for successful land and maritime operations. However, facing the PLA’s large-scale long-range strike capability and its strong air-control assets, Taiwan is highly likely to enter an early-war environment of “no air superiority, and possibly no air control at all.” Under such conditions, whether the Army can continue delivering effective fires, preserve combat power, and steadily degrade the enemy becomes the decisive factor in the island’s defense.
The main actors on the battlefield will no longer be massed artillery formations. Instead, dispersed, concealed, maneuverable, and asymmetric fire nodes will dominate. Wheeled self-propelled howitzers—thanks to their high mobility, rapid firing cycles, and excellent terrain adaptability—represent one of the fire platforms with the greatest survivability and sustained combat potential in Taiwan’s future ground warfare.
失去空優後的作戰環境
台灣的防衛特性，當陸軍面臨反登陸戰場時，空優很可能不再存在，甚至連陸航的存活都有可能是個疑問，這時反登陸作戰只能以自身的能力進行反擊，這時會面臨的是解放軍具備大量固定翼與旋翼無人機，可長時間滯空監視城鎮、要道、灘岸，戰場對敵方來說處於透明化的監視範圍下，大型集結區、固定陣地、明顯的砲兵陣地都會成為立即遭受打擊的目標。國軍砲兵只要展開時間過長，就會被快速偵測與精準彈藥反制，不論對方是遠程火箭、巡弋飛彈、長程自殺無人機等；烏俄戰場經驗已證明，當砲兵暴露後1–5 分鐘內就可能遭反砲兵打擊，「打後一分鐘內迅速轉移」、「永不固定位置化」，是台灣砲兵生存與持續作戰的生命線，失去空優後的戰場上，任何無法移動的火力，都只能活一次。
The Post–Air Superiority Battlefield Environment
In Taiwan’s defensive context, once the Army enters an anti-landing fight, air superiority will likely disappear, and even the survivability of Army Aviation assets becomes uncertain. Anti-landing operations may therefore have to rely entirely on ground forces’ own capabilities.
The PLA will be able to maintain persistent surveillance using vast numbers of fixed-wing and rotary-wing UAVs over urban areas, key routes, and beaches. From the enemy’s perspective, the battlefield becomes transparent. Large staging zones, fixed positions, or recognizable artillery emplacements will instantly become high-priority strike targets.
If ROC artillery units spend too long deploying, they will be rapidly detected and suppressed by precision munitions—whether long-range rockets, cruise missiles, or long-endurance loitering munitions. Lessons from the Russia–Ukraine war show that once an artillery element is exposed, it may be hit within 1–5 minutes. “Fire and displace within one minute” and “never occupy the same firing point twice” are the lifelines of Taiwanese artillery survival. On a battlefield without air superiority, any fire platform that cannot move will only live once.
不對稱作戰火力如何發揮？
台灣不需要與敵軍正面砲火對轟，過往大炮兵觀念可以丟掉，現在國軍都在講不對稱作戰，但不能只淪為口號，裝備的價格沒有不對稱、用法也沒有不對稱的思維，不對稱作戰應在地形、補給、短距離態勢下發揮對自己有利的交換概念；就砲兵來說，包含：
分散部署火力節點（Distributed Fires）：讓大建制的火砲攻擊成為毒蜂般的精準點殺，透過 C4ISR 火控網絡整合，接收來自無人機、陸基雷達、海岸偵巡雷達的目標資訊，不同地區的單砲或雙砲小組對同一目標實施同時火力打擊，且立即解散、補給、再重組攻擊下一目標，此模式可讓敵軍即使反擊擊中一個火力節點，也無法癱瘓整體火力網。
城市與地形偽裝成為主要防護：台灣城市密度極高，意味著地方廟宇、工廠區、物流倉庫、大樓下方空間、淺山道路、橋下通道、市區高架橋、地下道涵洞出口鄰近空地等都可以成為砲兵短暫停留或隱蔽的節點。在無空優的狀態下，只要能藏得住，砲兵就能存活，因此除了目視的偽裝外，熱源的偽裝也很重要，甚至假誘餌單位也有存在必要性。國軍目前有以空拍機檢視空中目視偵查偽裝效果，但尚未以紅外線熱成像或星光夜視鏡等其他方式檢視偽裝優劣，這也是需要改進的地方。
How to Apply Asymmetric Firepower
Taiwan does not need to engage in conventional counter-battery duels. The old doctrine of massed artillery fires can be abandoned. Asymmetric operations must not remain a slogan—equipment costs and tactical uses must both reflect asymmetric principles. For artillery, several concepts are key:
Distributed Fires
Instead of large artillery groupings, dispersed fire nodes can act like swarms of venomous bees delivering precise strikes. Through a C4ISR fire-control network integrating UAVs, ground radars, and coastal surveillance systems, single-gun or two-gun teams positioned in different areas can simultaneously strike the same target. They then immediately disperse, resupply, and regroup for the next strike.Even if the enemy counterstrikes and destroys one node, the overall fire network remains intact.
Urban and Terrain-Based Concealment as the Primary Protection
Taiwan’s dense urban and semi-urban environment provides numerous short-duration hiding points: temples, factory zones, warehouse districts, under-building spaces, foothill roads, under-bridge passages, elevated-road clearings, and drainage tunnel exits. When air superiority is lost, survivability depends on concealment. This includes not only visual camouflage but also infrared masking and the use of decoys.
The ROC military currently uses drones to inspect visual camouflage effectiveness but does not yet routinely assess concealment under IR or low-light devices—an area needing improvement.
戰場節奏型塑調整
台灣過往迷思於一次殲滅敵方登陸單位的火力使用，期望一次齊射就能解決所有登陸船團單位等，仍維持「正面殲滅火力」的思維，不對稱作戰應打破這種蓋面，以「打亂進攻節奏」、「逐次損耗敵方戰力」等為主，破壞登陸梯隊組織、削弱在海上集中或接近岸線的部隊、中斷登陸後的縱深推進、攻擊後續補給輜重器材人員等才是正確的方向，有點類似機動防禦的概念而不是正面硬剛，火力投射的高機動力才能適應這種作戰模式
要達成上述目標，當航空戰力資源無法提供近接支援能力時，地面部隊就需要一種能隨時抵達、迅速射擊、快速轉移且能活下去的火力投射砲兵系統。包含輪式自走砲、裝在輪式車輛上的高機動自殺無人機發射系統等，正是這一類武器的典型代表。其優勢最主要呈現在高度機動性上，20–30分鐘就能移動超遠距離達到跨縱深轉移，台灣西部的道路網密度極高，可形成砲兵外環機動圈，利用良好的6×6或8×8軍用卡車底盤能（軍規底盤優勢在此顯現，能快速在非良好地形移動）利用道路長距離移動後穿插至城市、農田、堤防等隱蔽區，一次射擊後立刻撤離，不會在同一地點反覆暴露，在反砲兵雷達普及的戰場上，敵軍就算來得及偵測，但來不及摧毀，使其成為「火力游擊戰」的核心。
相較於履帶式自走砲（例如台灣舊有或新採購的M109系列），輪式火力投射砲車車重較低，更容易通過鄉鎮小橋等支線道路、位置選擇自由度高，搭配外型貨櫃式偽裝，更利於都市或半都市化地形中的「短暫匿蹤」，在台灣高密度城市中，這種特性極為關鍵。在小國對抗大國軍隊的最佳戰術邏輯就是「消耗敵人、保存自己」，也才是不對稱作戰的真諦。
Shaping the Battlefield Tempo
Taiwan historically emphasized annihilating enemy landing forces in a single overwhelming strike, expecting one massive volley to neutralize an entire amphibious group. This reflects a “frontal destruction” mentality.
Asymmetric warfare requires abandoning such paradigms and instead focusing on disrupting offensive tempo and progressively attriting enemy combat power:
- breaking up landing waves,
- damaging units concentrated at sea,
- interrupting post-landing movement inland,
- and striking follow-on supply and logistics elements.
These concepts resemble mobile defense rather than frontal confrontation, and require high-mobility firepower capable of adapting to a fast-changing battlefield rhythm.
To achieve this, when airpower cannot provide close support, ground forces need fire-projection systems that can arrive quickly, fire quickly, relocate instantly, and stay alive. Wheeled self-propelled artillery and wheeled launchers for long-range loitering munitions are prime examples.
Their advantage lies in mobility: within 20–30 minutes, they can shift across great distances and operate across multiple depth layers. Taiwan’s dense western road network can serve as an “outer mobility ring” for artillery units. Military-grade 6×6 and 8×8 chassis allow rapid cross-terrain movement, enabling firing elements to maneuver into cities, farmland, or dikes, fire once, and withdraw immediately. They do not expose themselves repeatedly at the same location, making them ideal for a “firepower guerrilla warfare” style of operation. Even if enemy counter-battery radars detect them, they often cannot destroy them in time.
Compared with tracked SPHs (like Taiwan’s legacy and newly procured M109s), wheeled systems are lighter and better able to cross small bridges and rural roads, offering greater flexibility in position selection. With container-style camouflage, they blend more effectively into urban and semi-urban terrain. In a small state facing a major military power, the best strategy is to “wear down the enemy and preserve oneself”—the essence of asymmetric warfare.
台灣的登陸防衛概念形塑
台灣在登陸防衛作戰中（在此不討論解放軍是否會採用此戰術）可概略分為二階段：
- 灘岸外火力壓制（海上與灘前）：海峰大隊的反艦飛彈及可能有的長程自殺無人機、無人艇針對即將進犯的船團做百公里外的遠距打擊，先行化解或減弱進攻的力道，火砲單位可部署在桃竹苗工業區、彰化、雲林、嘉義農業地帶、台中港、台北港以南數十公里的河川堤防等後方隱蔽處，針對突破反艦飛彈網的登陸船團、奔襲靠岸的兩棲突擊車、氣墊艇、解放軍新式橋接艦與浮橋架設船隻等進行遠距破壞，削弱第一波衝擊，使其無法一次登陸大量部隊建立穩固橋頭堡。
- 灘岸決戰後的內陸阻敵：若敵軍登陸成功，機動火砲以城市為掩護快速轉移，同時針對敵軍推進路線（快速道路、聯外省道）實施機動火力突擊，打掉集結點、彈藥車、臨時補給點、甚至將聯外道路阻斷成為獵殺場，這時火山佈雷車的小用就真正發揮出來，以狙擊式砲兵的方式，拖慢敵軍速度，逐步削弱敵軍戰力與動能。在往後則可以退入山腳，台灣中央山脈貫穿全台，山腳地帶多為丘陵、坡地小鎮，輪式砲車可利用地形形成高角間接射擊優勢，且配合地面反裝甲武器，形成三維火力網，讓敵軍每前進一公里都付出成本。
Shaping Taiwan’s Landing-Defense Concept
Taiwan’s anti-landing defense (regardless of whether the PLA adopts such tactics) can be broadly divided into three phases:
- Offshore and Pre-Beach Fire Suppression：Anti-ship missiles and long-range loitering munitions from the Navy and coastal defense units strike incoming amphibious groups from over 100 km out. Artillery units, concealed in industrial zones (Taoyuan–Hsinchu–Miaoli), agricultural regions (Changhua, Yunlin, Chiayi), or river dikes near major ports, can disrupt surviving landing ships, amphibious assault vehicles, hovercraft, and bridging vessels—weakening the initial assault and preventing the PLA from landing in mass to establish a strong beachhead.
- Inland Interdiction After Beach Fighting：If the enemy succeeds in landing, mobile artillery will rapidly relocate under urban cover and strike advancing routes—expressways, provincial highways—destroying concentration points, ammunition vehicles, temporary supply points, or even turning road choke points into kill zones. Volcano minelayers will be highly valuable here. With sniper-style artillery tactics, Taiwan can slow the enemy advance and whittle down momentum. Retreating toward foothill regions, artillery can exploit Taiwan’s hilly terrain for high-angle indirect fire, forming a three-dimensional kill network with anti-armor teams. Every kilometer of the enemy’s advance must come at a cost.
在失去空優的島嶼防衛作戰中，致勝關鍵不再是集中火力一擊致命，而是火力能否分散存活、打擊能力是否能持續延續、敵軍再補給能力是否能被催毀或拖慢。在敵我力量懸殊、戰場透明化的情況下，台灣若能保有能夠持續戰鬥的火力，只要火力還存在，戰爭就不會結束，在此思維下，機動力，就是必須重視的關鍵；台灣陸軍的思維受限之前的高層，仍維持在大陸軍大裝甲時代，履帶戰車、自走砲給人雄壯威武的感覺，但是依照烏俄戰場的情況，既然裝甲已經無法防止無人機的攻擊，不如捨棄成本高昂的裝甲，轉化成機動性高成本較低廉、後勤較容易的輪式火砲投射載具。思維不改，不對稱作戰終究只是愚民的口號。
In a no-air-superiority island-defense scenario, victory does not come from massed firepower aimed at instant annihilation. It comes from whether fire assets can survive, whether fire output can be sustained, and whether the enemy’s resupply and mobility can be disrupted.
When forces are imbalanced and the battlefield becomes transparent, Taiwan’s priority is maintaining continuous fire capability. As long as firepower exists, the war does not end.Mobility thus becomes the decisive factor.
The ROC Army’s thinking—shaped by legacy leadership—still clings to the era of large armored formations. Tracked tanks and SPHs appear powerful, but the Ukraine war has shown that armor alone cannot protect against modern UAV threats. Rather than investing in expensive armored platforms, Taiwan should shift to highly mobile, lower-cost, logistically simple wheeled fire-projection vehicles.