【軍傳媒／軍事專欄】美伊戰爭牽動荷姆茲海峽的封鎖，伊朗對周邊海灣國家產油與天然氣設施的無差別攻擊，也牽動整個世界局勢，尤其對依賴其能源的印太地區國家來說，影響非常巨大。泰國、菲律賓、印度、日本、韓國紛紛啟動緊急措施，日本在這波美伊戰爭與荷姆茲海峽風險升高後，也展現出明確的危機應變。
日本官方在3月已坦承，約93%的原油進口要經過荷姆茲海峽，LNG雖然較分散，但實體庫存有限，若衝突延長，日本經濟仍可能受到顯著衝擊。日本2025年版《戰略能源計畫》也明白把地緣政治風險、維持石油庫存、提高釋放彈性、桌上兵推與釋放演練都列為政策重點，顯示日本並不是臨時抱佛腳，而是把能源中斷視為國家安全議題來準備。
面對危機的發生，日本不是只說會關注，而是已經在3月16日啟動緊急放出對策，3月24日決定由多座國家石油備蓄基地依序釋出原油、4月又宣布自5月起再加碼釋放20天份儲備。截至4月7日，日本仍保有約228天石油儲備，其中143天屬公部門庫存，同時日本還設定一個很具體的目標：到5月讓超過一半的原油改走不經荷姆茲的路線，並同步增加自美國進口。關鍵是不只是存量要增加，而是政府已把「釋放儲備、改變航路、改變採購來源」當成立即執行的政策工具。
此外，日本也知道石油與天然氣不能分開看，METI在2月就與 QatarEnergy、JERA 簽署緊急額外供應 LNG 的合作備忘錄，內容明定一旦全球LNG供需緊縮，或日本遭遇大型災害而威脅穩定供能時，日本政府可請卡達方面評估追加供氣，這代表日本的風險思維不只停留在國內存量，而是把上游供應商、長約、外交、民間電力公司一起綁進應變架構。雖然這次危機是卡達的LNG設施遭受攻擊減產，但至少日本有往上游應對尋求保險的方式。
根據CSIS公開報導，日本對進口能源依賴超過85%，2025年約94%的原油仍來自中東，但其LNG自中東進口占比已降到約11%；同時日本企業手上約有400萬噸LNG庫存，約相當於三週消費量。也就是說，日本不是沒有弱點，而是已長期在做「原油高依賴、LNG相對分散」的差異化配置，所以面對戰爭衝擊時，政府能迅速切換到「石油釋儲＋LNG外交補位」的雙軌模式。
相較之下，台灣的情況又是如何？台灣能源署資料顯示，台灣石油安全存量制度為業者60天、政府30天；天然氣安全存量規範則自2019年的7天逐步提高，2025年為11天，2027年要提升到14天，儲槽容積天數則由2025年的20天提高到2027年的24天。經濟部4月15日也再次強調，台灣已要求天然氣安全存量至少11天，並稱標準高於日本與韓國。單就帳面數字來看，台灣對於能源危機並不是毫無準備。
但問題在於，台灣政府仍以「高於法定規範、供應無虞、請國人放心」的籠統公開宣傳為主。經濟部3月與4月的說法大致一致，包括已啟動能源應變小組、每日盤點存量、調度多元氣源、4月至5月船期調整完成、6月增加非中東氣源，並搭配台電的機組調度與需求面管理預案；中油則表示短期可緊急採購其他地區現貨、調整成品油出口計畫、要求既有中長約LNG供應商增供，中長期則擴充輸儲設施。這些都不是沒做事，不過政府公開資訊裡，較少看到像日本那樣已啟動釋儲、設定明確替代比例、公告優先供應秩序、或提出具體分級限縮用能門檻的可視化措施，反而比較像在解釋的觀感，而根據過往經驗，當政府或國防部一直說一切都沒問題、一切都在掌握中時，通常就代表有些事情並未公布實際情況，而這也是外界質疑的地方。
台灣的另一個結構性弱點，在於電力系統對天然氣依賴愈來愈深。台電公布的2025年發電結構中，燃氣占53.3%，已是最大宗電源；而台灣整體進口能源依存度仍高，官方淨零簡報也提到2023年進口能源依存度為96.2%。換句話說，台灣雖然在天然氣採購來源上已分散到14國，且中油也強調來源橫跨中東、亞太、北美、非洲與歐洲，但只要海運出現嚴重中斷，問題就不只是油價，而是電力系統主燃料的到港時間會直接牽動供電安全。對日本而言，能源危機首先是經濟與物流壓力；對台灣而言，還可能迅速轉化為電力風險。
日本這次是以應對最壞情境的態度在處理，台灣的態度比較像是在處理目前可控情境。前者的邏輯是先假設荷姆茲長時間失靈，再倒推出釋儲、替代航線、額外供氣、外交施壓與產業保護；後者的邏輯則是先證明現況尚可掌控，再向市場說明短中期調度足以穩定供應。兩個國家的戰略文化不同、政治文化不同。日本偏向把風險前置化、制度化與公開化，台灣偏向把風險行政化、調度化與內部化。目前經濟部長在立法院備詢時回覆台灣的應對“與世界各國一樣”，各國情況不同，台灣怎麼會與他國相同，要嘛是經濟部沒有應對之法，要嘛就是傲慢到不屑告知國人。
先不管能源戰略儲備對國家安全及經濟的影響，以人民的需求來看，會希望政府公開最壞情境劇本，而不是只空講一切沒問題的虛話。社會想要知道若戰事持續，荷姆茲受阻30天、60天、90天，各階段會先動用哪些燃料、哪些產業優先、會有哪些需求限制措施。
總結來說，日本這次因應美伊戰爭的能源危機，關鍵不只是儲備比較多，而是它把能源危機當成已經發生的國家安全事件來處理，並迅速轉化為執行政策；台灣則具備一定法定存量與調度能力，但公開作為仍偏重穩定民心與市場，欠缺足以讓社會、產業感受到最壞情境已預先量化準備的訊號。台灣則有制度與調度基礎，但公開訊號較偏向安撫市場與說明「供應無虞」，在戰略溝通、需求管理與最壞情境演練的可見度上，與日本仍有明顯差距。當海運中斷、能源價格暴漲與電力吃緊同時發生時，依然把國家運作維持住，日本確實有執得台灣借鏡之處。
The U.S.–Iran war has heightened the risk of a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, while Iran’s attacks on oil and gas facilities in neighboring Gulf states have shaken global stability. The impact is especially severe for Indo-Pacific nations that depend heavily on Middle Eastern energy. Thailand, the Philippines, India, Japan, and South Korea have all launched emergency responses. Among them, Japan has demonstrated a particularly clear and structured crisis management approach.
Japan officially acknowledged in March that about 93% of its crude oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Although LNG sources are more diversified, physical reserves remain limited. If the conflict is prolonged, Japan’s economy could face major disruption. Importantly, Japan was not improvising. Its 2025 Strategic Energy Plan had already identified geopolitical risk, oil stockpiles, release flexibility, tabletop exercises, and emergency drills as policy priorities—showing that energy disruption is treated as a national security issue.
When the crisis emerged, Japan moved quickly. On March 16 it activated emergency release measures. On March 24 it began phased crude releases from national storage sites. In April, Tokyo announced another 20 days of reserves would be released starting in May. As of April 7, Japan still held around 228 days of oil reserves, including 143 days in public stockpiles. It also set a concrete target: by May, more than half of imported crude should avoid the Strait of Hormuz, while imports from the United States would increase. This showed that reserves, shipping routes, and procurement sources were all being used as active policy tools.
Japan also understands that oil and natural gas must be managed together. In February, METI signed an emergency LNG cooperation memorandum with QatarEnergy and JERA. If global LNG markets tighten or Japan suffers a major disaster threatening stable supply, Tokyo can request Qatar to assess additional shipments. This means Japan’s contingency planning includes upstream suppliers, long-term contracts, diplomacy, and private utilities. Even though Qatar’s LNG facilities were later affected by the crisis, Japan had already built a form of insurance.
According to CSIS, Japan relies on imports for over 85% of its energy. Around 94% of crude oil still comes from the Middle East, but LNG imports from the region have fallen to roughly 11%. Japanese companies also hold around 4 million tons of LNG stocks, equal to about three weeks of demand. In other words, Japan still has vulnerabilities, but it has spent years creating a differentiated model: high oil dependence, but more diversified gas supply. That allows a rapid shift into a “oil reserve release plus LNG diplomacy” strategy.
Taiwan presents a different picture. According to the Energy Administration, Taiwan’s oil stockpile rules require 60 days for private companies and 30 days for government reserves. Natural gas reserve requirements have risen from 7 days in 2019 to 11 days in 2025, with a target of 14 days by 2027. Storage tank capacity is also planned to expand. On paper, Taiwan is not unprepared.
The issue lies more in public messaging. Taipei continues emphasizing that reserves exceed legal requirements, supply remains stable, and the public should not worry. Officials say emergency task forces are active, inventories are reviewed daily, gas sources are diversified, shipping schedules adjusted, and more non-Middle Eastern LNG will arrive. CPC has also stated it can buy spot cargoes, adjust exports, and seek extra LNG from existing suppliers. These are real measures, but unlike Japan, Taiwan has not visibly announced strategic reserve releases, clear substitution targets, priority supply orders, or staged demand restriction thresholds. Public communication appears more reassuring than operational.
Taiwan also has a structural weakness: growing dependence on natural gas for power generation. Taipower’s 2025 generation mix shows gas at 53.3%, the largest single source of electricity. Taiwan’s overall import energy dependence remains above 96%. Although LNG supply now comes from 14 countries, serious maritime disruption would threaten not only fuel prices but electricity security itself. For Japan, an energy crisis means economic and logistics pressure first. For Taiwan, it could quickly become a power crisis.
Japan’s approach assumes the worst-case scenario first, then works backward to create reserve releases, alternative routes, diplomatic supply measures, and industrial protection. Taiwan’s approach appears to start by proving that the current situation remains manageable. This reflects different strategic cultures. Japan tends to institutionalize and publicize risk management. Taiwan tends to handle risk administratively and internally.
From a public perspective, citizens would likely prefer transparent worst-case planning rather than repeated assurances. People want to know: if Hormuz is blocked for 30, 60, or 90 days, which fuels will be used first, which industries receive priority, and what restrictions may follow?
In conclusion, Japan’s response to the U.S.–Iran war shows that the key advantage is not only larger reserves, but treating energy disruption as an active national security emergency and translating plans into action. Taiwan has reserve systems and adjustment capacity, but its visible response still focuses more on calming markets than demonstrating quantified readiness. If shipping disruption, soaring prices, and electricity shortages occur simultaneously, Japan offers lessons Taiwan would be wise to study.