【軍傳媒／軍事專欄】2022年以來，俄羅斯與中國空軍的發展軌跡顯著改變了西方對空中優勢的基本假設。俄羅斯在烏克蘭戰爭中雖承受高強度損耗，卻透過實戰經驗與防空整合重塑其威脅形態；中國則在戰機數量、射程與指管鏈路方面完成結構性躍升，首次在印太地區對美國及其盟友構成實質性的空優競爭壓力。
從歐洲到印太，空優不再是預設條件
在冷戰結束後至2010年代中期，西方軍事規劃普遍建立在一項隱性前提之上，就是一旦爆發高強度衝突，美軍及其盟友可在短時間內奪取並維持空中優勢。然而，過去三年的戰爭與軍力發展隱隱傳遞出新的訊息，這項前提可能 已不再適用。
根據英國智庫皇家聯合軍事研究所（RUSI）2026 年Insights Paper《The Evolution of Russian and Chinese Air Power Threats》在其研究中明確指出，無論是俄羅斯在歐洲戰區的作戰模式，或中國在印太的空軍建構方向，其共同目標並非全面擊敗西方空軍，而是提高西方取得空中優勢的成本與時間。對台灣而言，這項變化尤為關鍵，台灣不僅是印太地區的戰略前沿，其空防體系在衝突初期即承受來自解放軍的最大壓力，幾乎不存在「戰爭緩衝期」，空防體系的成敗直接決定了後果。
俄羅斯空軍的啟示，消耗未必等於削弱
俄羅斯空天軍（VKS）在烏克蘭戰爭中的損失，可能導致西方評估失誤，單純以戰機損失數量判斷威脅強度，極可能低估實際俄羅斯空天軍在高損耗下的能力保留。
依據RUSI與多個開源戰損資料，截至2025年，約有130架固定翼飛機在烏克蘭戰場被擊毀或重創，其中以Su-25與Su-34損失最為顯著。然而俄羅斯在過去三年間仍持續生產與交付Su-34、Su-35S、Su-30SM2以及少量Su-57，艦載與先進戰術機群規模未明顯縮減。
且雖然俄羅斯空天軍（VKS）固定翼飛機可能損失超過130架。然而，這並未導致俄軍空中作戰能力的崩解，原因在於其作戰模式已從「奪取空優」轉為「限制對手空中自由」。且俄羅斯基於戰地需求快速提升空勤與地空協同效能，空軍飛行經驗與GBAD（地對空防空）整合水平明顯提升，這表明在經歷俄烏戰爭的戰場洗禮後，VKS 的作戰熟練度與戰術靈活性已有顯著改善，尤其是在與綜合防空與電子戰系統協同作戰方面更具實戰基礎。
除此之外，俄軍中長程防空系統（如 S-400等）仍然是對西方空軍的重大威脅，雖然烏軍持續對俄軍短/中程SAM進行打擊，但多層式防空網與改進後的作戰程序仍能有效抵抗複合威脅，俄軍常程空對空飛彈在射程上仍具有絕對優勢，限制了烏克蘭戰機在領空上的行動，而俄羅斯的長距離打擊力量，包括 Tu-160、Tu-95 轟炸機搭載的Kh-101巡弋飛彈，以及空射匕首（Kinzhal，Kh-47M2） 高超音速飛彈等，對西方戰略目標仍構成一定的威脅。因此儘管俄羅斯空軍在數量與科技層級上仍落後於美軍或北約等西方國家，但其在特定戰域（如東歐）構成的空中聯合防禦與打擊能力仍不容忽視。
同樣的情況對台灣可能面臨的衝突具有高度參考價值，即使中國空軍在高強度衝突中承受損失，只要其防空網、指管系統與長程打擊能力仍然存在，台灣空軍就無法假設對手戰力會快速失效。
中國空軍三年內的結構性躍升
中國人民解放軍空軍在 2022–2025 年間的變化，並非但純線性數量成長，而是整體結構性擴張。根據RUSI與IISS交叉估算，J-20 隱形戰機數量已由約 150架增加至250架左右；J-16多用途戰機則是突破300架的規模，成為對台作戰的主力戰機，配套的空警-500預警機、運-20空中加油機與電子干擾作戰戰機同步增加，使解放軍首次具備持續性、高密度空中行動能力。
相較於歐洲戰區的廣闊縱深，台灣空域具有高度壓縮的地理特性。這使中國空軍遠程空對空飛彈的射程提升造成的威脅影響程度放大。印巴空戰中展現實力的PL-15空對空飛彈的有效射程以經證實在150公里以上，能藉由遠程突襲擊落印度先進的飆風戰機，這意味著解放軍戰機可在接近海峽中線甚至己方空域內，對台灣上空的目標形成威脅，同時台灣並無有效的空對空飛彈可以反擊，這種情勢不僅壓縮台灣戰機升空後的反應時間，等同讓出一部分空域，也迫使高價值支援平台必須後撤。對台灣而言，這代表傳統依賴戰機前往中線攔截、前推空優製造地對空防空飛彈火力防護的防衛思維，正快速失去實際操作空間。
三年前，中國空軍仍被視為是反介入體系的一環而已；然而三年的擴張，目前解放軍空軍能力已可在台海周邊執行有限度的空優爭奪，且質與量的同步增加，即便台灣新採購的F-16V迅速到位，也不見得在技術能力上大幅領先，未來台海空優衝突將不再是單向防禦，而可能是高密度的空中消耗戰，但這對無法自主生產高興能戰機，以及飛行員嚴重不足的台灣來說是極為不利的情況。
台灣空防面臨的結構性挑戰
由於領土的限制，台灣空軍高度依賴少數大型基地與有人戰機，且毫無縱深緩衝空間，這在高密度飛彈、遠程火箭與長程空中打擊環境下，將成為對手的首要目標，相比中國空軍具備更大的基地縱深與分散能力，除非將鄰近日本島嶼視為疏散地，不然在目前的環境下是無法相比擬。
未來空戰的關鍵不在於最終誰能取得空優，有可能是雙方都無法取得絕對性的空域掌握，真正重點在於誰能維持足夠的空中行動能力，對台灣而言，由於地域的限制，開戰初期的時間的壓力遠高於任何西方國家。另外高強度空戰將迅速消耗精準彈藥與防空攔截飛彈，若補充節奏無法跟上，不論是受空襲摧毀或只是耽誤補充時間，空防效能將呈現斷崖式下降，這些空窗有可能被趁機利用加大受衝擊的程度，最後呈現骨牌般連鎖反應。
台灣的現實選擇其實不多，在目前的情況下，接受空優不再是前提，而是目標，台灣必須認知一旦開戰，空防規劃需轉向「延遲、干擾、消耗」，在目前的敵我消長趨勢下，迅速奪取空優已經不能做到，不要再單純阿Ｑ思考認為我們一定能掌握空優。強化分散式空防與無人系統，低成本、可消耗平台將成為撐過衝突初期的關鍵，要能接受損失是必然的，只要在可接受的損失範圍內，且能迅速補充損失，就能延長台灣防衛的韌性，因此無人化分散化將是一定要執行的趨勢。
另外從烏克蘭的經驗，藉由北約提供的情報分享，烏克蘭才能有效並選擇性攔截俄羅斯的空襲，在可接受的損失情況下換取重要地點的防空防護，因此台灣與盟友建立空情與指管鏈路的即時整合是必要的，而非僅停留在政治層面的表象合作。
結論
過去三年，俄羅斯與中國空軍的發展顯示，空中優勢的天秤已經傾斜。對台灣而言，這一變化不是抽象的戰略討論，而是攸關存續的現實問題。若台灣仍以過去二十年的空戰假設規劃防衛，將有可能在開戰初期就耗損所有精銳。唯有及早調整思維、接受消耗戰本質，不再只著重撐過第一波，重新建構新空防結構思維，增加高低層（只技術成本而非物理高度）有效不對稱防禦，台灣才能在新世代空中威脅下維持有效嚇阻。
Since 2022, the evolution of Russian and Chinese air power has fundamentally challenged long-standing Western assumptions about air superiority. Although Russia has suffered significant aircraft losses in the war in Ukraine, it has reshaped its air threat through combat experience and tighter integration of air and air-defense operations. China, meanwhile, has achieved a structural leap in aircraft numbers, engagement ranges, and command-and-control integration, emerging for the first time as a credible competitor to U.S. and allied air superiority in the Indo-Pacific.
From Europe to the Indo-Pacific, air superiority can no longer be treated as a given. For decades after the Cold War, Western military planning assumed that air dominance could be rapidly secured at the outset of high-intensity conflict. Recent wars and force developments, however, suggest that this assumption no longer holds. According to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), both Russia and China aim not to defeat Western air forces outright, but to increase the cost, time, and risk required for the West to gain air superiority.
For Taiwan, this shift is particularly critical. As a frontline in the Indo-Pacific, Taiwan would face maximum pressure from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) at the very start of any conflict, with virtually no strategic buffer. The performance of Taiwan’s air defense in the opening phase would therefore be decisive.
Russia’s experience in Ukraine offers a cautionary lesson: attrition does not necessarily equate to collapse. Despite the loss of roughly 130 fixed-wing aircraft by 2025, the Russian Aerospace Forces have maintained combat effectiveness by shifting from seeking air superiority to constraining the opponent’s freedom of action. Improved aircrew experience, tighter coordination with ground-based air defenses, and sustained long-range strike capabilities mean that Russia continues to pose a serious threat in specific theaters, even while lagging behind NATO technologically.
This lesson is directly applicable to Taiwan. Even if the PLA Air Force were to suffer losses, Taiwan cannot assume that Chinese air combat power would rapidly degrade as long as air defense networks, command-and-control systems, and long-range strike assets remain intact.
China’s air power growth over the past three years has been structural rather than incremental. The J-20 fleet has expanded to roughly 250 aircraft, while the J-16 has surpassed 300 units as the primary platform for operations against Taiwan. Parallel growth in airborne early warning, aerial refueling, and electronic warfare assets has given the PLA the ability to sustain high-density air operations. In Taiwan’s geographically compressed airspace, the extended range of systems such as the PL-15 air-to-air missile magnifies their impact, compressing reaction times and forcing Taiwanese aircraft and high-value support assets to operate at greater risk or distance.
As a result, Taiwan’s traditional air defense concept—pushing fighters forward to contest airspace near the median line of the Taiwan Strait—is rapidly losing viability. What was once viewed as an anti-access challenge has evolved into the possibility of limited but intense air superiority contests. Given Taiwan’s inability to domestically produce advanced fighters and its shortage of trained pilots, a prolonged air war of attrition would be especially unfavorable.
Structurally, Taiwan faces severe constraints. Its air force depends on a small number of major bases with no strategic depth, making them highly vulnerable to missile and air strikes. Future air warfare may not yield absolute air superiority for either side; instead, success will depend on who can sustain air operations longer. High-intensity combat would rapidly deplete precision munitions and air defense interceptors, and any disruption in resupply could trigger cascading failures in air defense.
Taiwan therefore has limited but unavoidable choices. Air superiority can no longer be treated as a prerequisite, but as a contested objective. Air defense planning must shift toward delaying, disrupting, and attriting the adversary rather than assuming rapid dominance. Distributed air defense, unmanned and expendable systems, and the acceptance of manageable losses will be essential to maintaining resilience in the early phase of conflict.
Finally, Ukraine’s experience underscores the importance of real-time intelligence sharing and command-and-control integration with partners. For Taiwan, meaningful operational connectivity with allies—rather than purely political cooperation—will be critical to sustaining effective air defense.
In sum, the past three years have shown that the balance of air superiority is shifting. For Taiwan, this is not an abstract strategic debate but a matter of survival. Only by adapting its mindset, accepting the logic of attrition warfare, and restructuring its air defense toward layered, cost-effective, and asymmetric approaches can Taiwan maintain credible deterrence against next-generation air threats.