【軍傳媒／國際軍事新聞】俄烏戰爭進入第四年，戰場上仍未出現決定性突破，而空中打擊與遠程攻防卻持續升溫。十二月初，俄軍以逾六百架無人機及多枚飛彈發動自開戰以來最密集的攻勢，重創烏克蘭能源與交通網絡；烏方雖攔截多數來襲，但難免再度遭遇大規模停電。美國在日內瓦推動的停火框架由於美方28點過度貼近俄方立場，引發世界強烈批評；在歐洲與烏克蘭反彈下，烏克蘭重新提出一份19點框架，調整幅度相當顯著，但在國特使與俄羅斯會面後仍無顯著進展。
過去半年，戰事陷入難以突破的相持期，烏克蘭的反攻因兵力與彈藥短缺而受限，而俄羅斯則透過增加無人機自主產能與從外部取得彈藥，強化對烏能源與工業設施的攻擊。十二月初大規模空襲突顯俄方意圖，以系統性的能源戰逼迫烏克蘭在冬季承受更重壓力，且期望能拿下頓巴斯的戰略要地紅軍城，使其在談判桌上增加妥協空間。
28點方案的主要架構：形同烏克蘭的投降條款
根據外洩的28點方案內容，分成幾個方向
- 領土：採「以現況前線凍結衝突」為基礎，烏克蘭必須接受俄軍控制區在法律上的事實化，且要求基輔承認克里米亞以及頓內茨克、盧甘斯克兩州的俄方主權。等於完全承認2014年俄羅斯開始侵略後所侵佔的土地完全歸於俄羅斯。
- 軍隊：限制烏軍規模至約四十萬人，並禁止烏克蘭加入北約，也限制北約在烏境內的部署。這使得烏克蘭在戰後仍處於軍事弱勢，難以形成有效嚇阻能力，反而讓俄羅斯休養升息後能再次侵略，且避免烏克蘭轉向西方安全體系。
- 戰後秩序：方案對制裁、賠償與戰爭責任的處理相對模糊，未明確要求俄方為其侵略行為承擔法律後果，等於完全為俄羅斯跟普京解套，完全削弱了國際法的效用，證實世界法則仍是弱肉強食。
- 培植親俄政權：方案要求烏克蘭在短時間內舉行大選，在俄羅斯持續強化資訊戰與心理戰的情況下，將澤倫斯基趕下台培植親俄勢力，為之後的併吞做準備。
19 點框架：烏歐介入後的修正版本
由於28點等同要烏克蘭投降割地，引起歐盟及烏克蘭強大的反彈，並隨即修正成新19點框架，雖然仍保留部分「以現況為基礎的停火」概念，但在多處核心條款進行調整，使其更接近烏克蘭與歐洲的底線。
領土：不再以條文方式明確要求烏克蘭讓出克里米亞或頓巴斯，而是以較模糊方式交由未來談判或國際機制處理，這並未改變地面現況，但避免了烏克蘭在法律上立即承認領土喪失，這種模糊設計雖然無法立即翻轉局勢，卻為烏方保留政治空間，減少國內反彈。
烏軍規模上放寬到八十萬，並取消對某些武器發展的限制，這反映出歐洲希望烏克蘭維持足夠防衛能力，同時作為對俄羅斯侵略的緩衝，以避免戰後俄羅斯再次發動攻勢。
烏克蘭加入北約的相關條文被調整為歐洲主導的「集體安全保證」，並引入多國地面部隊駐烏概念，例如法國與英國尋求推動某種「戰後威懾存在」，以確保停火後俄軍無法輕易再破壞局勢。而這是俄羅斯最難接受的部分之一，因為它意味著烏克蘭雖未正式加入北約，卻得到實質上的安全保障，俄羅斯如同中國一樣，無法接受他人的強大。
戰後秩序：19 點框架刪除了戰犯特赦條款，凍結的俄國資產將被視為未來賠償與重建基金來源。這一點獲得歐洲廣泛支持，因為若未處理俄國責任問題，和平將難以持續，且未來將不再有任何嚇阻之力。
烏克蘭政權：新的19點雖未明確反對選舉，但調整選舉安排採「在安全情勢允許時」進行，避免在戰時立即推動選舉造成政局混亂，對基輔而言，這是維持內部穩定的重要緩衝，也是讓目前澤倫斯基政府有時間解決貪腐問題造成的民意不信任，避免整個政權重新被親俄勢力掌握。
孤立主義再起，世界動蕩不安
川普個性上具有跟普京及習近平一樣的人格特質，強勢的個性下其心理底層的觀點是看不起烏克蘭，從今年多次跟澤倫斯基的互動就可以窺知端倪。根據多家媒體的報導，28點方案的部分條文明顯源於俄羅斯去年提供給美國的一份停火草案，且每次川普與普丁見面後都會明顯偏袒俄羅斯，這使得外界普遍認為，這次美方並非提出中立的調解方案，而是在俄方條件基礎上作些微調整，川普觀念中並沒有要為烏克蘭爭取公平正義，其只是希望快速停火利於他的個人形象，同時達到快速脫離歐洲戰場泥沼，降低美國軍援負擔的政治成果，並以停火作為主要政治成果。在這種以「終止戰事」為目標的思維下，烏克蘭的領土只是一個與俄羅斯普京談判的籌碼，其意願川普根本不屑重視。
同樣的觀念用於最近的中日衝突以及未來可能的台海衝突，川普政府截至日前為止毫無任何支持日本政府的聲明，遏制中國無端生事的態度，可能是避免影響其個人與習近平見面的政治光環，這點相信高市早苗政府感受最深，其必須單獨面對中國的政治經濟軍事挑釁，但也促使日本認清現實，展開重振軍力的計劃，同時加速與菲律賓合作，在與韓國有歷史糾葛，其政府又傾向中國，日本必須在東亞尋找更多軍事上盟友。
再來看台灣，美國商務部長公開明說要把台灣的整個晶片產業鏈端走，台灣政府完全沒有任何抗議的聲音，當護國神山不在，台灣在美國眼中剩下什麼價值，直得美國出兵保衛？對美國而言，失去台灣可能導致其眼面無光，但並不會危及美國生存利益，甚至有可能將台灣當成交易的籌碼；但對台灣而言，卻是亡國的危機，這也是為何日本重新體認到美軍並不可靠，為此東亞將剩其獨立支撐，卻也是台灣的轉機，趁此機會增加及擴大與日本自衛隊的合作。
然而必須強調的是，美國社會與國會並非一致認同這個方向。許多議員與政策研究者公開批評28點方案會造成嚴重後果，失去領土的烏克蘭將無法在戰後保持穩定、歐洲安全環境將因此惡化，而俄羅斯在被認為「侵略成功」後可能於未來十年再次挑戰歐陸平衡，甚至中國受其鼓舞將發動台海戰爭，朝鮮與俄羅斯聯合奪回難朝鮮半島，中俄朝三國同時站上歷史榮光。
外國的政權我們無法影響，若台灣政府不真心為台，台灣民眾不認清國際現實，只想依靠外部安全保障，則烏克蘭的前例就會在台發生。烏克蘭與歐盟的關係是個啟示，台灣只有在地緣上尋找能共同抗中的盟友，才能共同對抗強敵的侵擾。理想很豐滿現實很骨感，重重的挑戰在眼前，卻也是台灣無法迴避，必須面對的課題。
As the Russia–Ukraine war enters its fourth year, the battlefield remains without a decisive breakthrough, while aerial strikes and long-range offensive operations continue to intensify. In early December, Russia launched its most extensive attack since the beginning of the war, deploying more than six hundred drones and multiple missiles to devastate Ukraine’s energy and transportation networks. Although Ukrainian forces intercepted many incoming threats, large-scale blackouts were once again unavoidable.
The ceasefire framework promoted by the United States in Geneva quickly drew global criticism, as Washington’s original 28-point proposal was perceived as overly aligned with Russia’s interests. In response to strong backlash from Europe and Ukraine, Kyiv put forward a revised 19-point framework, making substantial adjustments. However, despite subsequent meetings between U.S. envoys and Russian representatives, no significant progress has yet been made.
Over the past six months, the war has entered a difficult stalemate. Ukraine’s counteroffensive has been constrained by shortages of manpower and ammunition, while Russia has increased domestic drone production and sourced additional munitions from abroad to intensify strikes on Ukrainian energy and industrial facilities. The large-scale bombardment in early December underscored Russia’s intent to wage a systemic “energy warfare” campaign, applying pressure on Ukraine during the winter while aiming to seize the strategic Donbas stronghold of Chervonohvardiyka. Moscow likely hopes such gains will force Kyiv to accept concessions at the negotiating table.
The 28-Point Plan: A Framework Resembling Ukrainian Capitulation
Leaked details of the 28-point plan reveal several core themes:
- Territory：The plan freezes the conflict along the current frontlines, meaning Ukraine must accept the legal formalization of Russian-occupied territories. Kyiv would also be required to recognize Russia’s sovereignty over Crimea as well as the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. This amounts to fully acknowledging all territory Russia has seized since it began its aggression in 2014.
- Military Forces：Ukraine’s armed forces would be capped at around 400,000 personnel. The country would be barred from joining NATO, and NATO deployments within Ukraine would be restricted. This would leave Ukraine in a state of long-term military vulnerability, unable to build credible deterrence. It would also allow Russia to recover and later invade again while preventing Ukraine from integrating into Western security structures.
- Postwar Order：The plan treats sanctions, reparations, and war-crime accountability ambiguously. It does not require Russia to bear legal responsibility for its aggression, effectively granting Moscow and Putin an escape from consequences. Such an arrangement would severely weaken international law and reaffirm a world governed by brute force.
- Political Manipulation：The plan calls for Ukraine to hold nationwide elections within a short timeframe. Given Russia’s ongoing psychological and informational warfare, this could empower pro-Russian factions and force President Zelensky from power, paving the way for political subversion and eventual annexation.
The Revised 19-Point Framework: Adjustments Under European and Ukrainian Pressure
Because the 28-point proposal was perceived as tantamount to demanding Ukraine’s surrender, it triggered strong opposition from both the EU and Kyiv. The framework was revised to a 19-point version, which, while still retaining elements of a “status-quo-based ceasefire,” makes substantial shifts to meet Europe’s and Ukraine’s minimum security requirements.
- Territory：The new text no longer explicitly requires Ukraine to cede Crimea or Donbas. Instead, these issues are deferred to future negotiations or international mechanisms. While this does not change realities on the ground, it avoids immediate legal recognition of territorial losses and preserves vital political space for Kyiv.
- Ukrainian Military：The troop cap is raised to 800,000 and restrictions on certain weapons development are removed. This reflects Europe’s desire for Ukraine to maintain sufficient defensive capacity as a buffer against Russian aggression and to prevent a renewed offensive after the ceasefire.
- Security Architecture：Instead of addressing NATO membership directly, the 19-point plan establishes a European-led “collective security guarantee,” introducing the concept of multinational peace-enforcement forces stationed in Ukraine. France and the United Kingdom have proposed a postwar deterrence presence to ensure Russia cannot easily disrupt the ceasefire. This is one of the most unacceptable points for Russia, as it effectively grants Ukraine substantial security protection even without formal NATO membership. Like China, Russia is fundamentally unwilling to tolerate the strengthening of neighboring states.
- Postwar Order：The revised framework removes the clause granting amnesty to war criminals. Frozen Russian assets would be allocated for reconstruction and reparations, a move widely supported in Europe. Without addressing Russian accountability, sustainable peace would be impossible, and future deterrence would be undermined.
- Political Stability in Ukraine：While the 19-point proposal does not oppose elections, it stipulates they be held only when security conditions permit. This prevents political chaos during wartime and gives the Zelensky administration time to address public distrust exacerbated by corruption issues, preventing a premature shift in power toward pro-Russian factions.
The Return of Isolationism and Global Instability
Former President Trump exhibits personality traits similar to Putin and Xi Jinping—strong-willed, transactional, and dismissive of smaller states. His interactions with Zelensky throughout the year already revealed his disdain for Ukraine. According to multiple media reports, portions of the 28-point plan were directly derived from a ceasefire document Russia submitted to the U.S. last year. Each time Trump met with Putin, he displayed a noticeable pro-Russian tilt. This has reinforced widespread belief that Washington’s plan was not a neutral peace proposal but rather a lightly edited version of Russia’s own demands.
In Trump’s worldview, there is no intention to fight for fairness or justice on Ukraine’s behalf. His priority is a rapid ceasefire that enhances his personal image and extricates the U.S. from the European military quagmire, reducing the burden of aid to Ukraine. In such a mindset—focused on “ending the war” rather than ensuring a just peace—Ukrainian territory becomes a bargaining chip to trade with Putin, with little regard for Kyiv’s wishes.
The same dynamic can be observed in the recent China–Japan tensions and potential future Taiwan Strait crises. The Trump administration has shown no willingness to support Japan or deter China’s provocations, prioritizing his personal political optics in meetings with Xi Jinping. The Kishida-Sanae administration has borne the brunt of this pressure, facing China’s political, economic, and military coercion alone. Paradoxically, this has pushed Japan to accelerate its military revitalization and deepen security cooperation with the Philippines. With Korea historically entangled and its government leaning toward China, Japan is compelled to seek more security partners across East Asia.
Turning to Taiwan, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce openly stated the intention to relocate Taiwan’s semiconductor supply chain to the United States. The Taiwanese government voiced no protest; instead, it appeared grateful for perceived protection. Once Taiwan loses its semiconductor leverage, what remaining value does it hold in America’s strategic calculus—value significant enough to warrant U.S. military intervention? For Washington, losing Taiwan may cause reputational embarrassment but would not threaten national survival. Indeed, Taiwan could even become a bargaining chip. For Taiwan, however, this would be a matter of existential threat.
Japan has already realized that U.S. reliability cannot be assumed. This creates both pressure and opportunity: East Asia may increasingly depend on Japan as the region’s independent stabilizing force, and Taiwan must seize the chance to expand cooperation with Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.
A Warning from Ukraine: Nations That Do Not Face Reality Will Face Disaster
It is important to emphasize that U.S. society and Congress are not unified behind the conciliatory approach. Many lawmakers and analysts publicly warn that the 28-point plan would have disastrous consequences. A Ukraine forced to cede territory cannot remain stable; Europe’s security environment would worsen; and a victorious Russia may again challenge the European balance within a decade. China, emboldened by such precedent, might initiate a Taiwan Strait conflict, while North Korea and Russia could jointly attempt to reshape the Korean Peninsula—ushering in a moment of perceived historical triumph for China, Russia, and North Korea.
Taiwan cannot control foreign governments. But if Taiwan’s own leaders remain fixated solely on elections rather than national survival, and if the public clings to illusions of external protection instead of confronting geopolitical reality, then Ukraine’s tragedy may repeat itself in Taiwan.
Just as Ukraine’s relationship with the EU demonstrates, Taiwan must seek geographically aligned partners capable of jointly resisting Chinese expansionism. Idealism is a luxury; reality is harsh. The challenges ahead are immense—but unavoidable.