【軍傳媒／國際軍事新聞】2026年2月28日，美國與以色列對伊朗發動大規模空襲「史詩狂怒行動」，伊朗最高領袖Ali Khamenei在首波攻擊中就被直接鎖定，連同伊朗高層數十人一起被炸身亡。儘管伊朗內部權力結構與繼承機制仍有待觀察，但可以確定的是，這場斬首式打擊已將區域安全態勢推向新的臨界點。
美以這波行動的打擊重點同時涵蓋核設施、彈道飛彈相關基礎設施、雷達與防空節點，以及高層領導與指揮結構目標。這表示行動不是單點刺殺，而更像是一個以斬首作為開場的複合戰役，意圖在短時間內讓伊朗的報復能力與指揮鏈同時失衡。而伊朗的報復行動並非單純情緒性回應，而是一套經過計算的戰略設計，其目標不僅針對美以本身，也刻意向波斯灣周邊國家外溢，藉此重塑衝突的地理與政治成本結構。
伊朗報復外溢的戰略邏輯
伊朗對海灣國家的打擊，核心目的在於轉嫁戰略壓力。海灣多國境內駐有美軍基地或後勤設施，雖然這些國家未必願意直接參戰，但在戰略格局上已被視為美國軍力投射的一部分。當伊朗以無人機或飛彈攻擊其周邊國家美軍基地時，由於會經過該國領空，迫使該國出手攔截，因此伊朗的報復行動並不在於實際摧毀多少軍事設施，而在於迫使這些國家承受政治與經濟代價，進而向華府施壓，換取日後談判的更多空間。
由於伊朗持續數日接連對周邊國家使用自殺無人機級彈道飛彈等攻擊事件顯示，伊朗採取的報復節奏具有持續性，以多日連續的空中威脅會對防空體系形成高強度消耗，拉高攔截成本，也使區域社會心理處於長時間緊繃狀態。這種壓迫戰略比單次高強度攻擊更具政治效果。
另外由於最高領袖遭擊殺，對伊朗神權專制政權而言具有高度象徵性，必須對外強硬回應，有助於在國內鞏固權力核心的合法性，防止政權被視為軟弱，換言之，報復本身也是內政工具，避免因為領袖被殺導致政權崩潰，影響既得利益者的整體利益。
海灣國家的風險與伊朗的灰色地帶手段
伊朗的攻擊手段將呈現多層次特性。第一層為遠程火力，包括彈道飛彈與巡弋飛彈；第二層為大量低成本無人機，用於消耗對手防空資源；第三層則可能透過代理人組織或網路攻擊，在可否認空間內持續騷擾。
灰色地帶行動的優勢在於可控升級，只要避免造成大規模平民傷亡，伊朗便能在不觸發全面戰爭的前提下持續加壓，這種策略使中東區域局勢處於不穩定但未爆發全面戰的狀態，也有助於後續的轉圜。
荷姆茲海峽的戰略價值
荷姆茲海峽是全球能源運輸的核心瓶頸之一，真正的封鎖未必需要完全阻斷航道，只要使保險公司調升戰爭風險費率，將導致主要航運公司暫停通行，即可形成事實上的準封鎖。而能源的出口封鎖將大幅影響海灣周邊國家的能源出口導向經濟收入，間接迫使其對美國及以色列施壓。
伊朗封鎖海峽可能方式包括水雷部署、無人機/無人快艇蜂群戰術配合岸置反艦飛彈，以及對商船進行選擇性扣押。水雷尤其具有高戰略性價比，目前使用無人機攻擊油輪，已經發生實際攻擊事件，大型油輪每日租金已經高漲到55萬美金。與傳統海戰不同，荷姆茲海峽封鎖的關鍵指標不在於擊沉船隻數量，保費暴漲導致船班改道，能源期貨價格劇烈上漲，卡達也暫停出口天然氣，這些都將嚴重影響國際經濟。
美國可能的破解之道
美方若面臨荷姆茲危機，行動將集中在三個層面。首先是軍事層面，包括護航機制、掃雷與反雷作業，以及強化防空與反無人機網絡。川普總統宣稱已擊沈九艘伊朗軍艦，但核心目標是恢復航道可預測性，而非追求大規模海上決戰，目前只能說是壓制伊朗海軍威脅，但荷姆茲海峽狹窄，陸基飛彈或無人機可輕易攻擊其中船隻。
要解決這問題，美軍就必須做到打擊鏈壓制。若伊朗持續發射無人機與飛彈，美軍可能針對發射平台與指揮節點進行有限度打擊，以降低對方持續攻擊能力。不過目前科技來說要在廣大範圍內找到小型無人機發射地幾乎不可能，只能被動的高成本攔截。
在3月2日，美軍三架F-15E戰機被科威特誤擊擊落，雖然三位飛官都獲救，若美軍陣亡與受傷人數持續增加，國內壓力可能促使政策制定者重新評估戰略目標與作戰節奏。美軍可能會重新調整兵力部署、戰術優先序，甚至限制前線作戰範圍以減少暴露於反擊下的脆弱部隊。同時美軍大量傷亡有可能使原本提供基地與後勤支持的區域國家重新衡量協作關係，尤其是在這些基地位於主權國境內時。如果盟國承受反擊帶來的連帶風險上升，可能對軍事合作的條件或程度提出要求，對美軍行動形成額外政治與戰術限制。美軍的傷亡會增加戰場與政治兩端的壓力，這種壓力可向外推動停火談判，同時也可能促使指揮層尋求快速達成戰術目標以降低傷亡，這也是伊朗的不對稱打法，這種方式對有選舉壓力的民主國家頗為有效，但對極權國家來說，傷亡數字並不太會影響政權的存續。
未來局勢的可能走向
目前戰事發展為有限升級與邊打邊談。伊朗持續對海灣與以色列施壓，但控制在可降溫範圍內；美以則持續精準打擊軍事目標，避免地面戰。雙方都將損失控制在一定範圍內，但是隨著伊朗宣稱不會與美談判，未來衝突預料仍將持續。
伊朗也有可能將準封鎖升級。若出現水雷爆炸或多起商船遭襲，荷姆茲航運量將急劇下降，能源市場震盪加劇，全球經濟承受巨大壓力。若伊朗選擇多戰線擴張，利用代理人發動多面攻擊，當海灣國家遭受重大人員傷亡或關鍵基礎設施被重創，部分國家可能被迫直接參戰，或逼迫美以與伊朗談判，則伊朗可對內宣稱是他們逼迫對手和談，當雙方有台階下時，衝突才有可能降溫。
總結
此次中東衝突事件已不僅是一次斬首式打擊，而是重塑波斯灣戰略平衡的關鍵，美國可能試圖扶持建立友好政權，藉以掌握中東局勢，除了能斬斷與中國衝突時期能源來源外，也能挪出兵力專心對付強大的對手。而在伊朗就有政權為崩潰之前，的報復目標在於將衝突成本擴散至整個區域體系，並以能源與航運作為談判籌碼，試圖維持其既有政權及利益的存續。
不過綜觀以上，除了伊朗報復使用無人機之外，美國也是大規模使用無人機作為其攻擊戰術的一部分，顯示無人機已成為未來戰爭中的常態工具，預料未來在無人載具領域矛與盾的攻防將持續升溫。而科威特誤擊美軍軍機部分，則反映了在複雜戰場環境中，友軍誤擊是必須重視的問題，伊朗毫無制空權的情況都會發生如此混亂，未來台海衝突相關必不可少，證實前篇提到的IBCS將會是隱形且必要的投資。
Persian Gulf Strategic Reconfiguration in the Wake of Operation Epic Fury
On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a large-scale air campaign against Iran under what was reported as Operation Epic Fury. Multiple international media outlets, citing regional sources, indicated that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, was killed in the strike. Although Iran’s internal power structure and succession mechanism remain to be observed, it is clear that this decapitation strike has pushed regional security dynamics to a new critical threshold.
The targets of the U.S.-Israeli operation included nuclear facilities, ballistic missile–related infrastructure, radar and air defense nodes, as well as senior leadership and command structures. This indicates that the campaign was not a single assassination mission, but rather a composite operation that began with a decapitation strike and aimed to disrupt both Iran’s retaliatory capability and its command chain within a short period of time. Iran’s subsequent retaliation has not been a purely emotional reaction; instead, it appears to be a calculated strategic design. Its objectives extend beyond the United States and Israel, deliberately spilling over into Gulf states in order to reshape the geographic and political cost structure of the conflict.
The Strategic Logic Behind Iran’s Spillover Retaliation
Iran’s attacks on Gulf states are primarily intended to transfer strategic pressure. Many Gulf countries host U.S. military bases or logistical facilities. Although these states may not wish to enter the conflict directly, they are viewed within the strategic framework as extensions of U.S. power projection. When Iran launches drones or missiles toward U.S. bases in these countries, the projectiles pass through their airspace, forcing them to intercept. Therefore, the true objective is not necessarily the physical destruction of military assets, but rather compelling these countries to bear political and economic costs, thereby pressuring Washington and creating greater room for future negotiations.
Iran’s sustained use of suicide drones and ballistic missiles against neighboring states over several consecutive days demonstrates a deliberate tempo of retaliation. Continuous aerial threats impose high-intensity strain on air defense systems, increase interception costs, and keep regional societies under prolonged psychological pressure. This sustained coercive approach may produce stronger political effects than a single high-intensity strike.
The killing of the Supreme Leader carries profound symbolic weight for Iran’s theocratic system. A forceful external response helps consolidate domestic legitimacy and prevent perceptions of weakness. In this sense, retaliation also serves as a domestic political tool, aimed at preserving regime stability and safeguarding entrenched interests.
Risks to Gulf States and Iran’s Gray-Zone Methods
Iran’s retaliatory methods are likely to be multi-layered. The first layer consists of long-range firepower, including ballistic and cruise missiles. The second layer involves large numbers of low-cost drones designed to exhaust opposing air defense resources. The third layer may include proxy forces or cyber operations, sustaining harassment within a deniable gray-zone framework.
The advantage of gray-zone actions lies in controlled escalation. As long as large-scale civilian casualties are avoided, Iran can continue applying pressure without triggering full-scale war. This strategy keeps the Middle East in a state of instability without crossing into total regional conflict, leaving space for future maneuvering.
The Strategic Value of the Strait of Hormuz
The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints. A true blockade does not necessarily require physically sealing the waterway. If insurance companies significantly raise war-risk premiums, major shipping firms may suspend transit, creating a de facto quasi-blockade. Disruption of energy exports would severely impact the export-driven economies of Gulf states, indirectly pressuring them to influence U.S. and Israeli policy.
If Iran chooses to escalate in this domain, possible measures could include the deployment of naval mines, drone or unmanned boat swarm tactics combined with shore-based anti-ship missiles, and selective seizure of commercial vessels. Naval mines in particular offer a high strategic cost-benefit ratio. Even a single confirmed mining incident could rapidly undermine shipping market confidence.
Unlike traditional naval warfare, the key indicators of a Hormuz blockade are not the number of ships sunk, but rather spikes in insurance premiums, rerouting of shipping lanes, and sharp fluctuations in energy futures prices. Market psychology itself has become part of the battlefield.
Potential U.S. Countermeasures
If confronted with a crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, U.S. actions would likely focus on three dimensions. First, the military dimension, including convoy escort mechanisms, mine countermeasure operations, and strengthened air and counter-drone defense networks. The primary objective would be to restore predictability and confidence in maritime transit, rather than seeking a large-scale naval showdown.
Second, suppression of the strike chain. If Iran continues launching drones and missiles, the U.S. military may conduct limited strikes against launch platforms and command nodes to reduce Iran’s ability to sustain attacks.
Third, the economic and diplomatic dimension. A blockade is not truly broken until insurance markets resume underwriting and shipping companies return to normal scheduling. Military measures must therefore operate in parallel with financial risk stabilization.
Three Possible Future Trajectories
The first scenario involves limited escalation accompanied by intermittent negotiations. Iran continues to pressure Gulf states and Israel within controlled limits, while the United States and Israel conduct precision strikes to avoid a ground war. This currently appears the most plausible path.
The second scenario involves escalation into a quasi-blockade. If naval mine incidents or repeated attacks on commercial vessels occur, shipping volume through Hormuz could decline sharply, triggering severe volatility in energy markets and exerting heavy pressure on the global economy.
The third scenario entails multi-front expansion. If Gulf states suffer significant casualties or critical infrastructure damage, some may be compelled to enter the conflict directly, raising the level of confrontation.
Conclusion
This Middle Eastern crisis is no longer merely a decapitation strike; it represents a pivotal moment in reshaping the strategic balance of the Persian Gulf. The United States may seek to cultivate a more favorable regional order, potentially reducing adversarial energy leverage in future great-power competition while reallocating military resources toward other strategic priorities.
Before any regime collapse scenario materializes in Iran, Tehran’s retaliatory objective appears to be the diffusion of conflict costs across the broader regional system, using energy flows and maritime trade as bargaining leverage to preserve regime continuity and vested interests.
Overall, beyond Iran’s use of drones in retaliation, the United States has also employed unmanned systems on a large scale as part of its offensive tactics. This demonstrates that unmanned platforms have become a normalized tool of future warfare. The contest between offensive and defensive capabilities in the unmanned domain is therefore expected to intensify in the years ahead.
Meanwhile, the reported incident of Kuwait mistakenly engaging a U.S. military aircraft reflects the serious challenge of friendly fire in a highly complex battlespace. Even in a scenario where Iran possesses no air superiority, such confusion can still occur. In any future Taiwan Strait contingency, similar dynamics would be inevitable. This further reinforces the earlier argument that Integrated Battle Command Systems (IBCS) represent an essential yet often invisible investment in modern joint air and missile defense.