【軍傳媒／國際軍事新聞】2026年2月底開始的美伊戰爭，美軍雖仍維持壓倒性的整體戰力，雖然數日內美軍就宣稱摧毀伊朗本來就幾乎沒有的海空軍，但伊朗革命衛隊的分散化反擊仍造成美軍多起裝備損失與基地受創事件。
美軍中央司令部已確認，開戰初期三架F-15E戰機在任務期間遭友軍誤擊墜毀，兩架KC-135空中加油機於任務中空中擦撞，一架KC-135空中加油機於伊拉克西部墜毀，六名機組員罹難，另有一架F-35、一架F/A-18E/F於任務中受損緊急降落，五架KC-135空中加油機、至少一架UH-60直升機於機場被襲受損、12架MQ-9無人機被擊落。
上述是空中飛行器的部分，地面軍事資產的損失包括巴林的美國第五艦隊基地的指揮、通信、維持與基地運作設施受損。自開戰以來至少有 10 個雷達站遭到伊朗飛彈或無人機打擊，其中包括與 THAAD 相關的 AN/TPY-2 雷達，以及卡達的 AN/FPS-132 預警雷達，約旦、科威特、沙烏地、阿聯等地多部 AN/TPY-2雷達，以及巴林的 AN/TPS-59雷達，根據外媒的報導，前 96 小時美國相關的聯軍已耗用約 5,197 枚各型彈藥，僅彈藥替補帳單就達 100 億到 160 億美元，而且這還不含基地損害與高端防空裝備的折損。
美伊戰爭暴露美軍弱點
即便如常與各國軍事演習的美軍，真正戰爭時牽扯到保密與各自的政治利益，同盟相互識別仍會有缺漏，3架F-15E在、數秒內同時被擊落，不知道該高興武器有效還是飛行員警覺不足，幸運的是飛行員都彈射存活。而KC-135 則是在非敵火情況下相撞墜毀，這顯示高強度戰爭裡，包括空域管理、聯合作戰識別、支援航空與高節奏操作能力都會左右戰力。
另外開戰初期受損的高價值雷達與固定基地，正在成為比跑道更醒目的目，伊朗與其代理人反擊明顯在瞄準雷達、通訊、機庫、油料設施與基地附屬建物。不追求單次擊殺最多人，而是讓美軍的偵測、預警、攔截與再出擊能力整體下降，導致後續對無人機及彈道飛彈的攔截下降，海灣多國的煉油廠、天然氣廠等能源設施輕易被攻擊受損。
美軍原本認為絕對空優下，愛國者飛彈防空防禦就足夠，長期不注重野戰防空的思維下導致用昂貴攔截彈對付低成本的無人機，伊朗革命衛隊輕易逼迫高成本防空走向失衡，是這場戰爭的典型特徵，美軍高價裝備的受損導致防空部隊有如驚弓之鳥，烏克蘭的官方觀察團報告顯示曾目睹8枚愛國者飛彈攔截一架無人機的實例。美軍不顧韓國的反對從韓國抽調薩德系統支援中東以彌補戰爭的消耗導致的防空破口。
對台灣的警訊
從巴林與中東雷達站受損的案例看，真正決定防空是否還能運作的，是感測器、資料鏈、備援通訊、分散部署與快速修復能力。台灣不能再把防空理解成多買更多數量的防空飛彈，若雷達先被打掉，再多攔截彈也會失去效果。因此防空採購不能只看發射車與飛彈數量，還要把雷達備援、機動感測器、誘餌、假目標與戰損後的快速恢復納入整體設計。
美軍第五艦隊基地與多處雷達站受創說明，敵人會優先打油料、雷達罩、通訊、維修棚廠、衛星通信終端與機庫，而不只是打機堡或跑道。對台灣而言，空軍基地、海軍港區、彈藥庫、油庫與關鍵通資電設施，都必須按照「首波飽和攻擊一定會來」的標準來做分散與防護。
反無人機體系軟硬必須兼備，且必須走低成本、大量化，過往國防部一直強調台灣防空密度世界之高，這次直接戳破神話，連以色列鐵穹都面臨一樣的問題，未來台海衝突中，大量低成本無人機、巡弋飛彈、誘餌及彈道飛彈同時來襲，若台灣仍主要依賴高價防空飛彈應對，將很快出現成本失衡、彈藥消耗過快，甚至會造成這次巴林愛國者攔截附帶損害的問題。台灣需要的是分層式反制，除了高價防空飛彈的空域分層之外，電子干擾、高能雷射、機砲、低成本飛彈、可快速補充的廉價攔截設備等都需同步建構，但是這次的特別採購條例國防部對外的七大項目並沒有明確咧出有包含相關項目。
上週的立法院特別條例協商，國防部長顧立雄級戰略規劃司黃文啟中將已多次公開表示，台灣先前確實多次抱怨美製武器延誤，美國也正努力加快延宕的武器交付，主要延遲案例就是 2019 年訂購的 66 架 F-16V，但目前產線上有55架是台灣訂購的。不過若美軍自己也在高強度戰爭中折損飛機、消耗大量彈藥、修補基地與雷達，那麼對外軍售與交付排程承壓，本來就是可預期結果。這對台灣的警訊是平時就要把彈藥、零附件、機動雷達、無人機與戰損替補件盡量前推到台灣庫存或生產，而不能把希望押在戰時後續補運。
另外台灣應更重視「可快速恢復」而非只追求「第一次不被打中」，中東美伊戰爭案例顯示，再強的體系也不可能完全不受損，而美以聯軍這次是以先降低敵方的攻擊能力來增強自己的防禦能力。同樣的情況下換到台海可能的衝突，台灣有否足夠的能力對源頭進行打擊來減少攻擊？美軍號稱已經打擊萬個目標、摧毀對方的海空軍，但是仍遭受到一定的反擊，台灣面對的對手與伊朗是不同體量，真正有效的防禦到底是什麼？對台灣而言，關鍵不是幻想所有基地與雷達都撐住，而是要建立可拆可移、可快速替換的雷達與通訊關鍵設施，讓敵方即使打中，也無法長時間造成癱瘓。
荷姆茲海峽封鎖已對硫磺、銅、鈷等防務工業關鍵原料造成衝擊，連修復受損雷達、通訊設備與補造彈藥都會受影響。而除了關鍵原料，關鍵能源的問題也浮上檯面，荷姆茲海峽的封鎖，中東能源生產設施的受損導致產量降低，都會嚴重影響世界各國未來的發展。印太地區的國家這次受到的能源衝擊，未來將展開一定的搶油搶氣爭奪，台灣也必須提前思考做好準備。
Battle Damage in the Middle East and Lessons for Taiwan: What Recent U.S. Losses Reveal About Modern Warfare
The U.S.–Iran conflict that began in late February 2026 has provided a stark look at the realities of modern warfare. While the United States maintained overwhelming overall military superiority and quickly neutralized much of Iran’s limited conventional air and naval capabilities, dispersed retaliatory actions by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps still resulted in multiple losses of U.S. equipment and damage to key bases.
According to U.S. Central Command, early in the conflict three F-15E fighters were shot down by friendly fire during operations. Two KC-135 aerial refueling aircraft collided mid-air during a mission, while another KC-135 crashed in western Iraq, killing six crew members. Additional incidents included one F-35 and one F/A-18E/F forced to make emergency landings due to damage, five KC-135 tankers and at least one UH-60 helicopter damaged in airfield attacks, and twelve MQ-9 unmanned aerial vehicles shot down.
On the ground, damage extended to key military infrastructure. The U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain suffered impacts to command, communications, and base support facilities. At least ten radar installations were struck by Iranian missiles or drones, including AN/TPY-2 radars associated with THAAD systems, the AN/FPS-132 early warning radar in Qatar, and multiple AN/TPY-2 and AN/TPS-59 systems across Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain. Reports indicate that within the first 96 hours, U.S. and coalition forces expended over 5,000 munitions, with replenishment costs alone estimated between $10 and $16 billion—excluding base damage and high-end air defense losses.
Exposed Vulnerabilities in U.S. Operations
Despite extensive joint training, real combat conditions revealed gaps in coordination and identification among allied forces. The simultaneous loss of three F-15Es to friendly fire highlights the complexity of coalition operations under high-tempo conditions. Meanwhile, the mid-air collision of KC-135 aircraft—unrelated to enemy action—underscores the strain that intense operational tempo places on airspace management, coordination, and support functions.
High-value assets such as radar systems and fixed infrastructure have also emerged as primary targets. Iranian and proxy forces focused on degrading detection, communication, and sustainment capabilities rather than maximizing immediate casualties. By targeting radar stations, communications hubs, fuel storage, hangars, and support facilities, they reduced the effectiveness of early warning and interception systems, enabling follow-on strikes against energy infrastructure across the region.
The conflict also exposed a structural imbalance in air defense. Reliance on high-cost interceptors such as Patriot missiles to counter low-cost drones has proven inefficient. Observations from Ukraine have even documented cases where multiple interceptors were used against a single drone. To compensate for attrition, the United States redeployed THAAD systems from other regions, highlighting the strain placed on high-end air defense assets.
Implications for Taiwan
The damage to radar networks and support infrastructure underscores a critical lesson: effective air defense depends not only on interceptor numbers, but on sensors, data links, redundancy, dispersal, and rapid recovery capabilities. If radar systems are neutralized, even large stockpiles of missiles become ineffective. Taiwan’s defense planning must therefore integrate backup sensors, mobile systems, decoys, and rapid repair capabilities into its overall architecture.
The targeting of bases in Bahrain and elsewhere also demonstrates that adversaries prioritize fuel, communications, maintenance facilities, and support infrastructure—not just runways or hardened shelters. For Taiwan, this means air bases, naval ports, ammunition depots, fuel storage, and critical communications systems must be designed with dispersal and protection in mind, assuming that saturation attacks are inevitable.
Counter-drone systems must combine both hardware and software approaches, emphasizing low-cost, scalable solutions. The conflict has shown that even advanced systems can be overwhelmed by large numbers of inexpensive threats. Taiwan must adopt a layered defense approach, combining high-end interceptors with electronic warfare, directed energy systems, gun-based defenses, and low-cost interceptors that can be rapidly replenished.
Another key warning concerns logistics. If U.S. forces themselves face aircraft losses, ammunition depletion, and infrastructure damage, delays in foreign military sales and resupply are inevitable. Taiwan must therefore prioritize pre-positioning of munitions, spare parts, mobile radar systems, and unmanned platforms domestically, rather than relying on wartime deliveries.
Equally important is the concept of rapid recovery. The conflict demonstrates that no defense system is immune to damage. Instead of focusing solely on preventing initial strikes, Taiwan must ensure it can quickly restore operational capability. This requires modular, mobile, and easily replaceable systems that can sustain operations even under repeated attack.
Finally, the broader strategic environment is shifting. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have already affected key materials such as sulfur, copper, and cobalt—critical inputs for defense production. Damage to energy infrastructure has also highlighted vulnerabilities in global supply chains. For Indo-Pacific nations, including Taiwan, energy security will become an increasingly pressing concern, requiring proactive planning and diversification.
Overall, the lessons from the Middle East conflict point to a clear conclusion: modern warfare is defined less by individual systems and more by resilience, integration, and the ability to sustain operations under continuous pressure.